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AMD

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD) is a semiconductor company that designs and supplies CPUs, GPUs, and related platforms for data center, client, embedded, and gaming workloads.

  • x86 CPUs and accelerated processing units for client Process Control System (PCS), workstations, and mobile devices (compute infrastructure)
  • Data center CPUs and Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) accelerators for cloud, Artificial Intelligence (AI), and High performance computing (HPC) environments (AI infrastructure / HPC)
  • Discrete GPUs for gaming, professional visualization, and graphics workloads (graphics and visualization)
  • Embedded processors and SoCs for networking, industrial, automotive, and edge systems (embedded computing)
  • Platform enablement including chipsets, software stacks, and ecosystem support with OEMs, cloud providers, and ISVs (platform and ecosystem)

More About AMD

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD) develops Central Processing Unit (CPU) and GPU architectures used in enterprise data centers, cloud platforms, client systems, and embedded deployments. Enterprise technical teams use AMD processors as core building blocks for x86 server infrastructure, virtualized environments, AI training and inference clusters, HPC, and graphics-intensive workloads. AMD works with global OEMs and cloud service providers to offer servers and instances based on its data center CPUs and GPU accelerators, enabling organizations to select AMD-based options within standard enterprise procurement and cloud catalogs.

In the data center segment, AMD offers multi-core x86 server processors (compute infrastructure) designed for rack servers, cloud nodes, and scale-out architectures. These CPUs support common enterprise operating systems, hypervisors, and container platforms, and integrate with standard server components such as Double Data Rate (DDR) memory, PCI Express (PCIe) (I/O interconnect), and Non-volatile Memory Express (NVME) storage. For AI and HPC, AMD provides GPU accelerators (AI infrastructure / HPC) that use parallel compute architectures, High Bandwidth Memory (HBM), and interconnect technologies such as PCIe and dedicated GPU-to-GPU links. These accelerators are used with popular AI and HPC software frameworks and are deployed in nodes that connect into cluster fabrics using Ethernet or InfiniBand.

For client and commercial endpoints, AMD supplies desktop and mobile processors (client compute) combining x86 CPU cores and integrated graphics, suitable for enterprise PCS, workstations, and thin-and-light laptops. These platforms support standard enterprise management frameworks, security features implemented at the silicon and firmware level, and compatibility with mainstream operating systems and productivity applications. AMD also offers discrete GPUs (graphics and visualization) for professional workstations used in Cohort Analysis Dashboard (CAD), media, visualization, and simulation workflows, where ISV-certified drivers and support for APIs such as DirectX, OpenGL, Vulkan, and OpenCL are relevant.

In embedded and edge markets, AMD provides embedded processors and SoCs (embedded computing) targeted at networking equipment, industrial control, medical devices, thin clients, and other specialized systems. These products are selected for long lifecycle availability, extended-temperature operation in some cases, and integration with real-time operating systems or Linux-based stacks. They connect through standard interfaces such as Ethernet, PCIe, and various serial buses, enabling use in gateways, edge compute nodes, and industry-specific appliances.

Across these product families, AMD positions its offerings as alternatives to other x86 and GPU platforms in categories such as data center compute, AI accelerators, Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI), graphics workstations, and embedded control systems. For directory and taxonomy purposes, AMD can be categorized under CPU platforms (compute infrastructure), GPU platforms (AI infrastructure / graphics and visualization), client processors (endpoint computing), and embedded processors (embedded and edge computing). Its portfolio is integrated with a broad hardware and software ecosystem, including Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) servers and PCS, cloud provider instances, and third-party application stacks used in enterprise and institutional environments.

At-A-Glance

  • Employees: 26,000
  • Estimated Annual Revenue: $10B+
  • Stock Ticker: AMD

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Corporate Headquarters

2485 Augustine Dr
Santa Clara, CA 95054

Market Segmentation

  • Type: Public
  • Sector: Information Technology
  • Group: Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment
  • Industry: Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment
  • Sub-Industry: Semiconductors

Acquisitions

Mentions

CISA Issues Guidance on Secure Boot Bypass in UEFI Apps

June 18, 2026

Overview Multiple vendor-signed UEFI applications are vulnerable to Secure Boot bypass via a "Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver" (BYOVD)-style attack. If a target system trusts the affected vendor’s certificate, an attacker can exploit these applications to execute arbitrary code during the early pre-boot phase before the operating system initializes. To mitigate this risk, system administrators should apply updates to the UEFI Forbidden Signature Database (DBX) that revoke trust in the affected vendor-signed binaries, preventing these vulnerable applications from executing during the boot process. Description The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) standard defines the modern firmware architecture used to initialize hardware and transfer control to the operating system during system startup. On systems with Secure Boot enabled, UEFI applications and drivers must be cryptographically signed and verified before execution. Trust for these signatures is established through several firmware-managed databases, including the authorized signature database (DB), which commonly contains certificates from original equipment manufacturer (OEM) vendors, operating system authorities, and other supply-chain partners in the UEFI ecosystem. The UEFI shell is a command-line application that allows advanced users to interact directly with the UEFI environment to run diagnostics or special tasks prior to the operating system boot. Other UEFI applications, such as bootloaders, manage the operating system startup sequence or load specific drivers before the main OS initializes. Some of these applications possess functionalities that can manipulate system memory, modify sensitive NVRAM variables, or load raw drivers. If a vendor-signed application inadvertently exposes these capabilities without strict access controls, attackers can abuse them to circumvent Secure Boot policies and execute unverified code. This exposure effectively results in an early compromise of the pre-boot environment, bypassing the Secure Boot policy. Researchers from ESET identified multiple UEFI applications vulnerable to this type of abuse. To neutralize the risk, the affected binaries will be added to vendor-specific DBX revocation lists to prevent them from executing on the target systems. Impacted UEFI Applications [Vendor, Application and vulnerable function Authenticode SHA hash SHA256 file hash] Acer `GRUB2` insmod 71DCE405964C67779DB92DBC01F683D6E29075AB 6cc0e9501420ec036f0ad74df2d17f4d6360f26585f265042537b9f8c2780c30 Acer `UEFI shell` mm,dmpstore D275C2DFD884D2B7842C7F861C527A9FFC6E59DD b0af2158f11535d8458b8497a35e96d5afc76e43825f255d2d6aa2da74bad883 Acer `UEFI shell` mm,dmpstore 42C4923E676A9FD0A93C08631AD7A8244A8F2174 0784c30a83bfcc45bf42804e5729323987957f0a104fcb693d0ff10d76d5b42c Acer `UEFI shell` mm,dmpstore 04BE47C873F116B85111FBF8EE9191C87CEE2619 b0af2158f11535d8458b8497a35e96d5afc76e43825f255d2d6aa2da74bad883 Acer Emdoor `UEFI shell` mm,setvar CD5E3EAD6F78526BF9301DEEF66906618654F604 14a493007443c72050ce644562db1470e36bf9d04baf5dec6b046e32cbdbb61b AMD `UEFI shell` mm,dmpstore 744565FBB35DB710BCC1547292204763C731DC55 58bc1e460a1b7e18e6ad12dae8020c38bd7b3d6217130dd127ae232e4b248406 ASUS schenker-tech.de(XMG) `UEFI shell` mm,dmpstore DC18D31E46A541C9E42F9588554ADDC7DECE124B 61ee9a23c366a102ceb34c78af7816413769791658cdb668b02cb81ec94f7c70 ECS `UEFI Shell` mm,dmpstore 59BA2B5C239AF3CC7FCE74AA5E65AAA8CE3C454F 81da15d6acdfb7868ecea44d41c869c2295603af9a44a2d106d4c0e57d66908 Getac `UEFI Shell` mm,dmpstore 35FBD8ED5ED31D281A6146360CDEFE7E8CEC31DA 09d895bb03bdac3188ef61b09ab72b99492cfd0b785cbc3eb2eb75657a2f9fa0 GIGABYTE Maibenben `UEFI Shell` mm,setvar,dmpstore 6CC172CBFEEA24B2806B477F8EDF897334ECC486 2944da098861619e21b522a642235bb2ec189ff20ef96e100b2ffdd9a39c3416 Toshiba `UEFI Shell` mm,dmpstore 2EAE2807A4265D9C30EECA68A8C59C7A6D1ACFE7 cad246ae8a5db51f32f128896ccef5efc30e5d65c9d9722b449988d43da53d51 Uniwill Maingear schenker-tech.de(XMG) `UEFI Shell` mm,dmpstore 8CED62F9BD5C987A80598DA1E13414391BBB1ADE 55682bec887134a2ccaa2cd5458cd3fe6395ea93bb88c9dc541806428b14fc66 Impact This vulnerability only impacts systems where the specific affected vendor's certificate is trusted within the UEFI Authorized Signature Database (DB). On such systems, an attacker with administrative privileges or physical access could leverage the vulnerable application to bypass Secure Boot protections and execute arbitrary code before the operating system loads. Code executed during this early boot phase can achieve persistent platform compromise, including the ability to load unsigned or malicious kernel components that survive system reboots and operating system reinstallations. Because this activity occurs before the operating system and endpoint security products initialize, malicious code executed through this technique may completely evade detection by standard security controls and endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions. Solution Apply the latest firmware and software updates provided by your hardware or software vendor. Please refer to the Vendor Information section for details. Updated software packages will replace vulnerable UEFI applications with corrected versions that incorporate the latest upstream security fixes.Additionally, administrators should update and verify the UEFI DBX on affected systems to ensure the vulnerable binaries are revoked and can no longer execute during the boot process. Acknowledgements Thanks to Martin Smolar of ESET for researching and reporting this vulnerability. This document was written by Vijay Sarvepalli.