Netskope details update and uninstall affiliate redirects in AI Sidebar with DeepSeek AI

A Chrome extension removed from the Chrome Web Store in January 2026 for scraping AI conversations resumed shipping code to enterprise browsers in July 2026, with a replacement payload that monetizes on every update and uninstall. The pattern matters for organizations managing browser supply-chain risk and extension permissions.

Research overview

Netskope Threat Labs analyzed a Chrome extension identified as “AI Sidebar with DeepSeek AI” and discussed its behavior across multiple versions. The post describes how the extension’s earlier build handled AI sidebar functions and how later builds changed the payload delivered to managed endpoints.

The analysis references aggregate usage data collected by the Netskope Security Cloud platform from a subset of Netskope customers. Netskope Threat Protection detections and related capabilities are used to describe how the new build behaved on the network and browser layers.

Key findings

Netskope reported that the extension was delisted for AI conversation theft and later relisted, continuing to update an existing install base via Google’s CRX distribution infrastructure. Netskope described a clean-to-malicious update sequence in which one version carried no malicious payload and a later version introduced the new behavior.

The post states that version 1.7.3.0 removed the earlier conversation-exfiltration code but added a monetization payload. Netskope also describes that the extension suppresses redirection of DeepSeek users to ChatGPT.

Technical breakdown

Netskope describes the extension’s monetization behavior as a chain tied to Chrome update and uninstall events. The service worker declares a partner URL and opens it in a foreground tab when Chrome reports an update.

The post states that the partner URL is resolved through Bitly to Buzzy, and it cites the service’s public affiliate program paying a 30% commission on referred subscriptions. Netskope also reports that comments in the code indicate the behavior was intended to avoid firing on install while still firing on updates.

For uninstall, Netskope reports that the extension opens the same partner URL by taking advantage of Chrome’s single-uninstall-URL rule where the last writer wins. The post describes asynchronous configuration timing used to register a second value after a configuration fetch, so a removal action still triggers the affiliate redirect.

Operational impact and remediation

Netskope Threat Protection detected and blocked extension version 1.7.3.0 as it arrived on enterprise endpoints from the Google CDN. Netskope labeled the behavior as “Trojan.GenericFCA.Script.37952” and described silent tab injection and uninstall-URL hijacking as covert actions.

Netskope Threat Protection also categorized earlier exfiltration domains as command-and-control and malicious sites for the phase 1 behavior. The post says Netskope NG SWG could support URL filtering outcomes, while Netskope Enterprise Browser provides allowlist, blocklist, or force-install controls at the browser layer to prevent the extension from running.

For mitigation, the post describes internal actions such as removing the extension ID inhcgfpbfdjbjogdfjbclgolkmhnooop from managed browsers and verifying that it is not present in force-install or allowlist policy. Netskope also states that it reported the extension to Google’s Chrome Web Store before publishing the post.

Disclosure and indicators

The post includes a disclosure noting that Netskope reported the extension to Google’s Chrome Web Store before publishing. It also provides a set of indicators, including the extension ID and SHA-256 hashes for version 1.7.3.0 and version 1.7.2.0 CRX files.

Netskope lists domains associated with earlier conversation scraping behavior, describing them as prior C2 endpoints for conversation exfiltration that are described as offline in the newer phase. It also lists a Bitly URL used for an affiliate redirect opened on update and uninstall.

The overall takeaway is that an extension previously removed for AI conversation theft returned with a revised build that removed the exfiltration code and added update- and uninstall-triggered affiliate redirects. For enterprise browser governance, the blog signals that marketplace removal alone may not end exposure and that internal extension controls, visibility, and package inspection are part of remediation for the managed install base. This “Blog Signals brief” is a fact-based summary of the vendor blog.

The original article was written by Decision Insights Editorial.