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Nokia and Cinia partner on managed 24/7 DDoS protection for Finland

April 16, 2026

Nokia and Cinia said they will partner on an advanced Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) protection offering aimed at safeguarding critical infrastructure networks in Finland.

The companies described a Managed Security Service Provider (MSSP) model intended to support resilience and continuity of essential services, with Cinia operating a 24/7 DDoS protection service for its customers.

Nokia Deepfield Defender is described as providing AI-based, network-embedded DDoS detection and mitigation. The solution uses advanced correlation and analysis of IP network and flow telemetry, and it pairs network-wide insight with broader internet context obtained through Deepfield Genome.

Cinia will use the Nokia solution through the MSSP model and will incorporate detection and mitigation capabilities developed by Nokia into its managed service. “Our cooperation with Nokia enables us to offer the most advanced DDoS protection capabilities on the market to our customers. By leveraging Cinia’s Network Operation Center (NOC) and Security Operations Center (SOC) services and experience in 24/7 monitoring of critical environments, together with Nokia’s cutting-edge technologies, we ensure that our customers' networks and internet-facing services remain secure and reliable even as the threat landscape evolves. This partnership allows us to bring truly market-leading protection and operational visibility to Finnish customers,” said Jukka-Pekka Lithovius, Development Director at Cinia. “Working with Cinia underscores Nokia's commitment to securing critical infrastructures globally and locally. By integrating our Deepfield and IP routing solutions with Cinia’s managed services, we are enabling powerful protection against cyber threats. This collaboration ensures that vital mission-critical networks remain operational and secure, contributing to the stability and trust, which are essential for a connected society,” said Jeff Smith, Vice President and General Manager of Nokia Deepfield. The collaboration also described joint development of the solution for up-to-date defense against DDoS threats, including botnet DDoS attacks.

Related Perspectives

CISA issues update on missing IPsec integrity for Verizon IMS SIP signaling

June 2, 2026

Overview VoLTE deployments on Verizon’s IMS network have historically lacked IPsec-based integrity protection for SIP signaling, contravening well-established requirements in 3GPP TS 33.203 and GSMA IR.92. As a result, SIP messages—including registration (REGISTER), call setup (INVITE), and messaging (MESSAGE)—were transmitted in plaintext without cryptographic guarantees of integrity or authenticity. Passive analysis of live traffic over multiple months confirmed the consistent absence of SIP Security Agreement headers and ESP traffic, indicating a systematic configuration decision rather than an isolated anomaly. In response to repeated follow-up inquiries, Verizon stated on [insert date] that integrity support is “currently available at their request” and will be extended to all UEs “starting later this year.” Separately, the researchers recently observed that Apple’s iOS 26.5 carrier bundle (released May 11, 2026) includes IMS IPsec-related configuration entries—an indication that device-side support may now be active or enabled in newer software. While this change is promising, its real-world impact remains uncertain: there is no evidence yet that Verizon has modified its network to enforce IPsec, that the configuration is being activated per session, or that integrity is functionally operational in production deployments. Absent explicit verification (e.g., captured ESP traffic or official confirmation), this may reflect preparatory software changes rather than an end-to-end security upgrade. The vulnerability remains active for the vast majority of Verizon VoLTE users during the unprotected period, and until network-level enforcement is observed and confirmed, the risk of on-path signaling manipulation endures. Description CVE-2026-10629 SIP signaling stack in Verizon IMS (unspecified version) implements SIP signaling without IPsec integrity protection (missing Security-Client/Security-Server headers and ESP traffic), which allows an on-path attacker to compromise confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of VoLTE signaling via passive monitoring and active manipulation of unsecured SIP messages over the radio and core network. According to 3GPP TS 33.203 and GSMA IR.92, SIP signaling between the UE and P-CSCF in IMS networks must be protected using IPsec ESP with mandatory integrity following IMS AKA authentication. This protection is negotiated via SIP Security Agreement headers (Security-Client, Security-Server, Security-Verify) during registration and results in integrity-protected ESP traffic for all subsequent signaling messages. However, observations conducted over several weeks on Verizon’s network showed no such headers in use. The REGISTER exchange lacked any security negotiation, and post-registration SIP traffic—including INVITE, MESSAGE, BYE, and UPDATE—traversed the network in plaintext over standard UDP/TCP, with no ESP encapsulation. This pattern was consistent across device models and network conditions, indicating a systemic configuration decision rather than a transient issue. The absence of integrity checking means any modification to SIP messages—including redirection of emergency calls or injection of fake message payloads—would go undetected by both the UE and the IMS core. No technical justification for this deviation from globally adopted security practices has been provided by Verizon, and prior engagement failed to elicit a substantive response beyond the recent, non-binding commitment to future deployment. Impact The lack of IPsec integrity protection enables on-path attackers—including those controlling femtocells, compromised base stations, or IMS intermediaries—to intercept, modify, replay, or inject SIP messages without detection. These capabilities permit call hijacking, spoofing of SMS-over-IMS, denial-of-service through forged BYE or CANCEL, and manipulation of emergency call routing—without requiring compromise of the UE, SIM, or backend infrastructure. Because SIP signaling lacks cryptographic integrity, all such modifications go unnoticed by both the UE and the IMS core, undermining core security assumptions of VoLTE. While the recently observed iOS 26.5 configuration change may signal progress toward a more secure implementation, its operational impact is yet to be demonstrated; until then, the risk remains real and unmitigated for users on unprotected deployments. Solution Until the vulnerability is fully mitigated by Verizon, users and enterprises should continue to assume VoLTE signaling is untrusted for high-assurance operations. Acknowledgements Thanks to DongWon Lee, Jeongmin Choi, and CheolJun Park from Kyung Hee University for their thorough technical report, persistent follow-up efforts, and the additional observation regarding iOS 26.5. Their work has significantly advanced the understanding of this issue and helped keep the discussion grounded in observable behavior. This AI-assisted document was written by Timur Snoke.